Parametric Rolling: SGISC Level 1 and Level 2 Criteria
Parametric rolling is resonant roll growth from cyclic GZ variation in waves, screened by the Level 1 and Level 2 vulnerability criteria of IMO MSC.1/Circ.1627.
Parametric rolling is a resonant roll motion in which a ship’s righting arm varies cyclically as a longitudinal wave passes along the hull, feeding energy into roll until the amplitude grows to dangerous angles in head or following seas without any direct transverse wave force. It is one of five dynamic stability failure modes assessed under the IMO Interim Guidelines on the Second Generation Intact Stability Criteria, MSC.1/Circ.1627, dated 10 December 2020 and approved by the Maritime Safety Committee at its 102nd session. Those guidelines are recommendatory. The mandatory intact stability instrument remains the 2008 Intact Stability Code, Resolution MSC.267(85), whose criteria are evaluated on a calm-water righting lever curve and therefore cannot see the mechanism at all.
Mechanism: righting arm variation in a longitudinal wave
Parametric rolling starts because the transverse second moment of area of the waterplane changes as a wave moves along the hull, and that change transfers directly into metacentric height.
The waterplane inertia about the centreline is
$$I_T = \int_L \frac{1}{12}\,b(x)^3\,\mathrm{d}x$$with \(b(x)\) the local waterline beam in metres. It depends on the cube of the local beam, so a hull with fine underwater sections at the ends and pronounced flare above the waterline changes \(I_T\) sharply for a small change in local draught. Since \(BM = I_T/\nabla\) and \(GM = KB + BM - KG\), a passing wave modulates the metacentric height.
The direction is fixed and is frequently reported backwards. A wave trough amidships gives the maximum GM, because the flared bow and stern are deeply immersed while the wall-sided midship body sits less deep, so the mean instantaneous waterplane is wider than in calm water. A wave crest amidships gives the minimum GM, because the waterplane at the immersed bow and stern is narrower than in calm water.
Writing the metacentric height as a mean plus a harmonic variation at the encounter frequency \(\omega_e\),
$$GM(t) = GM_m + \delta GM \cos(\omega_e t)$$and linearizing the righting lever about the upright position gives the undamped Mathieu equation
$$\ddot{\phi} + \omega_0^{2}\left[1 + \frac{\delta GM}{GM_m}\cos(\omega_e t)\right]\phi = 0$$where \(\phi\) is the roll angle in radians and \(\omega_0\) is the natural roll frequency in radians per second. Instability appears in tongues that open from \(\omega_0/\omega_e = n/2\). The first and dominant tongue is principal parametric resonance:
$$\omega_e = 2\omega_0 \qquad \Longleftrightarrow \qquad T_e = \tfrac{1}{2}T_\phi$$The encounter period at principal resonance is half the natural roll period. The ship passes a wave crest amidships twice for every roll cycle. Sources that state the natural roll period is about twice the encounter period are describing the same relation inverted.
Roll damping decides whether the resonance can start. Adding a linear damping term lifts each instability tongue clear of the axis, so parametric rolling requires the stability variation to outrun the damping:
$$\frac{\delta GM}{GM_m} > \frac{4\alpha}{\omega_0}$$with \(\alpha\) the linear roll damping coefficient. That inequality is the physical origin of the Level 1 standard value, and it is why an area of steel welded to the bilge appears in a stability criterion.
Amplitude is bounded by nonlinearity rather than by damping. As heel increases the righting lever departs from \(GM\phi\), the effective natural frequency shifts, and the ship detunes itself out of the resonance band. That is why a developed parametric roll settles at a large steady amplitude instead of growing without limit.
Hull forms and loading conditions at risk
The exposed hull has fine underwater sections forward and aft, pronounced bow flare, and a wide flat transom stern, because that combination maximizes the swing in waterplane area as a wave passes.
Container ships are the classic case, and large and ultra-large designs most of all. Car carriers, ro-ro vessels, some cruise ships and fine-form fishing vessels are also exposed. Full-form tankers and bulk carriers, with high block coefficients and near wall-sided ends, show very little of the effect.
The loading condition framing has shifted since the phenomenon entered general awareness. The classical case was a head-sea event at moderate metacentric height. The evidence accumulated since 2020 points at least as strongly the other way, toward low metacentric height, a long natural roll period, and following seas. MARIN’s TopTier work advises particular alertness where the roll period exceeds 20 seconds on ships over 250 metres, a condition produced by low GM rather than high.
Free surface corrections apply to the parametric rolling assessment, following chapter 3 of part B of the 2008 IS Code. That is a deliberate contrast with the excessive acceleration failure mode, where MSC.1/Circ.1627 does not apply them.
The SGISC framework and where parametric roll sits in it
The Second Generation Intact Stability Criteria are ship-specific assessments for dynamic stability failure modes, issued as MSC.1/Circ.1627 on 10 December 2020 and covering five modes: parametric rolling, pure loss of stability, surf-riding and broaching, the dead ship condition, and excessive acceleration.
The legal hook is section 1.2 of part A of the 2008 IS Code, which permits an Administration to apply criteria demonstrating that the safety of a particular ship or group of ships is sufficient, having regard to the phenomena the section describes. Section 1.2.1 names righting lever variation as the cause of parametric roll, pure loss of stability, or combinations of the two.
Four routes are treated as equivalent in the regulatory sense: clear Level 1; clear Level 2; pass a direct stability assessment; or accept operational limitations or carry operational guidance. Levels may be skipped, so a designer may go straight to Level 2 or straight to direct assessment, and operational measures may be substituted for the vulnerability criteria altogether.
The guidelines state their own limits plainly. They are not intended to be used in lieu of the mandatory criteria of the 2008 IS Code, and although they were developed envisioning future incorporation into that Code, they record that they require testing before being used as mandatory criteria.
The development record singled out parametric rolling as one of the two modes considered ready. The guidelines note that the dead ship criteria sometimes give non-consistent results between levels, that the excessive acceleration criteria may require further refinement, and that pure loss gives very conservative results for ships with low freeboard, while parametric rolling and surf-riding and broaching “have sufficient scientific background and feasible methods for regulatory use.”
Level 1 vulnerability criterion
Level 1 is a hydrostatic screening test with no speed term and no hydrodynamics. A ship is not vulnerable if both of the following hold:
$$\frac{\delta GM_1}{GM} \le R_{PR} \qquad \text{and} \qquad \frac{\nabla_D - \nabla}{A_W (D - d)} \ge 1.0$$The second condition is a flare test. It equals exactly 1.0 for a wall-sided hull, exceeds 1.0 where there is flare above the waterline, and falls below 1.0 for tumblehome.
The metacentric height variation amplitude is the difference in transverse waterplane inertia between two parallel waterplanes:
$$\delta GM_1 = \frac{I_{TH} - I_{TL}}{2\nabla}$$The two draughts come from a standard wave of length equal to the ship length and steepness \(S_W = 0.0167\), so a wave height of \(0.0167L\):
$$\Delta d_H = \min\left(D - d,\ \tfrac{1}{2}L S_W\right), \qquad \Delta d_L = \min\left(d - 0.25\,d_{full},\ \tfrac{1}{2}L S_W\right)$$with \(d_H = d + \Delta d_H\) and \(d_L = d - \Delta d_L\), and \(d - 0.25 d_{full}\) not taken below zero. The increments are asymmetric by design: the upward excursion is capped by freeboard and the downward excursion by draught, so only a ship with generous freeboard sees the full half wave height in both directions.
The standard value R_PR
\(R_{PR}\) is not a table. It is one constant and three piecewise-linear branches:
$$R_{PR} = \begin{cases} 1.87 & \text{sharp bilge} \\[4pt] 0.17 + 0.425\,\dfrac{100 A_k}{LB} & C_{m,full} > 0.96 \\[6pt] 0.17 + \left(10.625\,C_{m,full} - 9.775\right)\dfrac{100 A_k}{LB} & 0.94 \le C_{m,full} \le 0.96 \\[6pt] 0.17 + 0.2125\,\dfrac{100 A_k}{LB} & C_{m,full} < 0.94 \end{cases}$$with \(100 A_k/(LB)\) capped at 4 in every branch. \(A_k\) is the total overall area of the bilge keels and no other appendage, and \(C_{m,full}\) is the midship section coefficient of the fully loaded departure condition in calm water.
Three consequences follow from the algebra. A ship with no bilge keels gets \(R_{PR} = 0.17\) whatever its midship coefficient. The interpolation branch joins the outer branches exactly, returning 0.2125 at \(C_{m,full} = 0.94\) and 0.425 at 0.96, so the function is continuous. And the cap gives a maximum of 1.87 for a full midship section, identical to the sharp-bilge value, against 1.02 for a midship coefficient below 0.94.
\(R_{PR}\) is standing in for roll damping. That makes the criterion unusually sensitive to a single drawing-office number, and an error in the bilge keel schedule, such as omitting one side or counting a docking keel, moves the verdict directly.
Level 2 vulnerability criterion
Level 2 carries two independent checks and a disjunctive pass test. A ship is not vulnerable if
$$C_1 \le R_{PR1} = 0.06 \qquad \textbf{or} \qquad C_2 \le R_{PR2} = 0.025$$Passing either check clears the ship. This inverts the logic of the pure loss of stability Level 2 criterion, where the larger of two indices must satisfy a single standard, so both checks must pass. The parametric rolling section contains no symbol \(R_{PR0}\).
C1, the susceptibility index
\(C_1\) needs hydrostatics in waves and nothing more:
$$C_1 = \sum_{i=1}^{16} W_i C_i$$\(C_i\) is zero if either sub-check is satisfied in wave case \(i\), and one if neither is. The first sub-check requires the metacentric height in the wave to stay positive and the variation ratio to fall below \(R_{PR}\):
$$GM(H_i, \lambda_i) > 0 \qquad \text{and} \qquad \frac{\delta GM(H_i, \lambda_i)}{GM(H_i, \lambda_i)} < R_{PR}$$The denominator here is the average GM over the wave series, not the calm-water GM that Level 1 uses. The standard value is reused unchanged from Level 1.
Ten crest positions are evaluated in each wave case: amidships, then 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4 and 0.5 wavelengths forward, and 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 and 0.4 wavelengths aft, with the ship balanced in sinkage and trim on each. With 16 wave cases that is 160 equilibrium solutions per loading condition.
The second sub-check asks whether the ship can physically reach resonance, and is satisfied when the resonant speed exceeds the service speed:
$$V_{PRi} = \left|\frac{2\lambda_i}{T_r}\sqrt{\frac{GM(H_i,\lambda_i)}{GM}} - \sqrt{\frac{g\lambda_i}{2\pi}}\right|$$The second term is the deep-water wave celerity and the first is the speed at which the encounter period equals half the roll period, corrected for the change of metacentric height in the wave.
The 16 wave cases
The weights derive from the North Atlantic scatter of IACS Recommendation No. 34 and sum to exactly 1.0.
| Case | Weight | Wavelength (m) | Wave height (m) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 0.000013 | 22.574 | 0.350 |
| 2 | 0.001654 | 37.316 | 0.495 |
| 3 | 0.020912 | 55.743 | 0.857 |
| 4 | 0.092799 | 77.857 | 1.295 |
| 5 | 0.199218 | 103.655 | 1.732 |
| 6 | 0.248788 | 133.139 | 2.205 |
| 7 | 0.208699 | 166.309 | 2.697 |
| 8 | 0.128984 | 203.164 | 3.176 |
| 9 | 0.062446 | 243.705 | 3.625 |
| 10 | 0.024790 | 287.931 | 4.040 |
| 11 | 0.008367 | 335.843 | 4.421 |
| 12 | 0.002473 | 387.440 | 4.769 |
| 13 | 0.000658 | 442.723 | 5.097 |
| 14 | 0.000158 | 501.691 | 5.370 |
| 15 | 0.000034 | 564.345 | 5.621 |
| 16 | 0.000007 | 630.684 | 5.950 |
The wavelengths correspond to a uniform wave-period grid running from 3.802 seconds to 20.098 seconds in constant steps of 1.0864 seconds.
C2, the severity index
\(C_2\) requires a nonlinear time-domain roll simulation:
$$C_2 = \frac{1}{25}\left[\sum_{i=1}^{12} C_2(Fn_i,\beta_h)
- \tfrac{1}{2}\left{C_2(0,\beta_h) + C_2(0,\beta_f)\right}
- \sum_{i=1}^{12} C_2(Fn_i,\beta_f)\right]$$
The 25 conditions are 12 head-sea speeds, 12 following-sea speeds and one zero-speed case taken as the mean of the head and following evaluations, which are physically the same condition. Speeds are the service speed scaled by twelve factors running from 1.0 down to 0.131.
Each term counts sea states in which the maximum roll angle exceeds 25 degrees. Roll amplitude is evaluated with the ship balanced on waves of length equal to the ship length at eleven heights from zero to a tenth of the ship length, by time-domain simulation with the righting lever computed in waves, and the result is interpolated onto the sea-state cells of the scatter table.
Two properties of C2 matter more than the arithmetic. It is evaluated in head and following seas only, with no oblique-sea component. And MSC.1/Circ.1627 specifies no simulation method, no minimum degrees of freedom and no damping model; the damping model reaches the calculation through Appendix 3 of the Explanatory Notes, MSC.1/Circ.1652.
Only principal parametric resonance is addressed. The guidelines state that other types of parametric rolling may occur with much smaller probability and are not covered.
Direct stability assessment
Direct stability assessment replaces the simplified formulae with numerical simulation or model testing of the specific hull, and it sets a quantitative safety level: an average stability failure rate not exceeding 2.6 x 10 to the minus 3 per ship per year.
A stability failure is defined as roll exceeding the lesser of 40 degrees, the calm-water angle of vanishing stability, or the calm-water angle of submergence of unprotected openings; or a lateral acceleration exceeding 9.81 metres per second squared at the highest location along the ship where passengers or crew may be present. For parametric rolling the simulation must include at least heave, roll and pitch.
Note the discontinuity with Level 2, which counts a failure at 25 degrees of roll. The two tiers do not measure the same event.
Three assessment routes are treated as equivalent. The full probabilistic route requires a mean long-term failure rate not exceeding 2.6 x 10 to the minus 8 per second, with wave directions and speeds uniformly distributed. The probabilistic design-situation route works to the upper boundary of the 95 per cent confidence interval against a threshold of one failure every two hours in design sea states, and for parametric rolling it fixes the design situation at head and following waves at zero forward speed. The deterministic design-situation route requires the greatest mean three-hour maximum roll amplitude to stay below half the failure threshold, from at least 15 hours of full-scale-equivalent simulation per situation.
The hard part is rarity. A simulation of realistic length usually contains no failures at all, so the guidelines require statistical extrapolation and make its validation part of the assessment. Extrapolation over wave height uses a model in which the logarithm of the mean time to failure is linear in the reciprocal of the square of significant wave height, needing at least three directly counted rates spanning at least 2 metres of significant wave height, each taken as the upper bound of its 95 per cent confidence interval.
Where the three tiers disagree
The tiers are not a monotone ladder of strictness, and the disagreement runs in both directions.
Level 1 is conservative by construction. ClassNK puts it plainly in its own guidance: Level 1 “may impose significant restrictions on ship operation conditions, as this criterion is based on a large safety margin corresponding to its simplicity.” A Level 1 failure means the cheap filter could not clear the ship, not that the ship is unsafe.
C1 is reproducible and C2 is not. Independent implementations of the criteria by ABS and by Creative Systems on the same benchmark hulls returned C1 values of 0.436 and 0.436 for one container ship and 0.436 and 0.440 for another, agreeing to three decimal places. The C2 values for the same hulls were 0.062 against 0.12, and 0.074 against 0.090. The difference is the simulation: one implementation used a three-dimensional nonlinear panel code, the other a purpose-built three-degree-of-freedom body-exact strip theory solver, and both are compliant readings of a clause that specifies neither.
A higher tier has failed a ship the lower tier cleared. Denmark and the World Shipping Council reported to SDC 10 in November 2023 that for the container ship Maersk Essen in its accident loading condition, a one-degree-of-freedom solver returned a pass against Level 2 C2 while a six-degree-of-freedom nonlinear panel code returned a failure. The ship had rolled beyond 30 degrees and lost 689 containers on 16 January 2021, with parametric resonance identified as the most likely cause. The submission observed that a Level 3 calculation should not fail a ship that Level 2 shows compliant, particularly where an incident actually occurred.
Three structural mismatches sit behind that outcome, and each is checkable against the criteria text:
- Threshold. Level 2 counts a failure at 25 degrees. The ship’s own loading program permitted 19.18 degrees before lashing loads exceeded their safe working load, so the regulatory failure angle sat above the commercial one.
- Environment. The wave cases and the scatter weights come from the North Atlantic. The casualty occurred in the Pacific in swells of 6 to 8 metres at periods of 15 to 18 seconds, a combination that carries little weight in North Atlantic data.
- Method. With no specified simulation, the choice of solver decides the verdict.
The criteria can also clear a vulnerable ship. Finland told SDC 12 in January 2026 that new or existing ships, even where they pass the vulnerability check in the interim guidelines, may still be vulnerable to parametric rolling in unfavourable conditions. That is a Member State asserting false negatives on the record.
SDC 10 concluded that revising the interim guidelines was premature and that more data and practical experience in their application were required.
Worked example: a benchmark container ship at Level 1 and Level 2
The KCS benchmark container ship has a length between perpendiculars of 230.0 metres, breadth 32.2 metres, depth 19.0 metres, design draught 10.8 metres, displacement volume 52,030 cubic metres, midship section coefficient 0.9849 and metacentric height 1.327 metres.
The design wave. \(h = 0.0167 \times 230.0 = 3.841\) metres, so half the wave height is 1.9205 metres. The freeboard cap is \(19.0 - 10.8 = 8.2\) metres and the lower cap is \(10.8 - 2.7 = 8.1\) metres, so neither binds and both draught increments take the wave value. The evaluation draughts are 12.7205 metres and 8.8795 metres.
The stability variation. The published variation amplitude is 0.991 metres, which implies a waterplane inertia difference of \(2 \times 52{,}030 \times 0.991 = 1.03 \times 10^{5}\) metres to the fourth across that draught band. Against a calm-water metacentric height of 1.327 metres:
$$\frac{\delta GM_1}{GM} = \frac{0.991}{1.327} = 0.747$$The standard value. With \(C_{m,full} = 0.9849\) the first branch applies. The published \(R_{PR}\) of 0.354 corresponds to a bilge keel area ratio of \((0.354 - 0.17)/0.425 = 0.433\), so a total bilge keel area of about 32 square metres.
The Level 1 verdict. \(0.747 > 0.354\), so the ship fails the first condition by a factor of 2.1. The flare ratio is 1.004 and clears its threshold, but both conditions must hold, so the ship proceeds to Level 2.
The sensitivity. To clear Level 1 the ship would need \(R_{PR} = 0.747\), which requires an area ratio of \((0.747 - 0.17)/0.425 = 1.357\) and therefore a bilge keel area of about 100.5 square metres, roughly 3.1 times the actual area. The ratio sits inside the cap of 4, so the criterion is satisfiable, but nothing else in it can move: the hull, the loading condition and the wave are all fixed.
Level 2 C1. The published index is 0.436, identical in both independent implementations. Because the 16 weights sum to exactly 1.0, that value identifies the failing set: summing the weights from case 7 upward gives 0.436616, which rounds to the published figure. The ship is vulnerable in every wave case from 7 to 16 and clear in cases 1 to 6. Case 7 has a wavelength of 166.309 metres, so the boundary sits at \(166.309/230.0 = 0.72\) of the ship length: every wave longer than about 0.72 L scores a failure. This reconstruction is an arithmetic inference from the published index and the published weights.
\(C_1 = 0.436\) against a standard of 0.06 is a failure by a factor of 7.3.
Level 2 C2. The published values are 0.062 and 0.12 in the two implementations. Both exceed 0.025, so both fail, and the ship fails Level 2 on both checks in both codes. The verdicts agree while the numbers differ by a factor of 1.94, which is the practical meaning of a method-dependent index.
Operational limitations and operational guidance
Where a ship cannot demonstrate compliance by calculation, MSC.1/Circ.1627 offers two operational routes, and they are not interchangeable.
Operational limitations restrict the ship. They may permit operation only in specified areas or routes and, where appropriate, in a specified season, in which case the environment is described by the scatter table for that area and season. Or they may permit operation only up to a maximum significant wave height, in which case the assessment is rerun on the scatter table truncated at that height.
Operational guidance informs the decision. It defines the combinations of ship speed and heading relative to the mean wave direction that are not recommended in each sea state, and it must be provided as easily accessible and understandable information in graphical form, commonly a polar diagram. Automatic alert systems are permitted where the sailing condition approaches an unacceptable region.
The information burden differs sharply. An area and season limitation needs no weather data in service. A wave height limitation needs a forecast. Operational guidance needs a detailed forecast wave spectrum, wind characteristics, and an onboard means of showing the master which speed and heading combinations to avoid.
Two provisions stop this route becoming a way to certify an unsuitable hull. The equivalence standard requires operational measures to provide at least the same level of safety as the vulnerability criteria or the direct assessment. And the practicality cap makes a loading condition unacceptable if the total duration of all situations that should be avoided exceeds 0.2 of total operational time, computed on the full scatter table with uniformly distributed headings and speeds.
The guidelines also warn that guidance may declare conditions safe for roll that are unattainable or dangerous for other reasons, naming parametric rolling in bow waves as the example: roll may fall with increasing speed, but the speed may be unreachable or may cause excessive vertical motions.
Parametric roll against synchronous roll and pure loss of stability
These three are routinely confused, and the confusion has consequences on the bridge.
| Parametric rolling | Synchronous rolling | Pure loss of stability | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Driving mechanism | Stability varies as a wave passes | Direct transverse wave force | Stability falls on a single crest |
| Sea direction | Head, bow, following, quartering, and beam | Beam | Following and quartering |
| Timing | Encounter period about half the roll period, or about equal to it | Encounter period equal to the roll period | Ship held on one crest |
| Development | Builds over many encounters | Builds over many encounters | Single event |
| SGISC status | Failure mode with Level 1, Level 2 and direct assessment | Not a separate SGISC failure mode | Failure mode with its own criteria |
Synchronous rolling is what a beam sea does. Parametric rolling is what a longitudinal sea can do while the ship appears to be on the safest heading, which is precisely what makes it dangerous. Pure loss of stability shares the physical cause of parametric rolling, since both come from stability varying as a wave passes, but it fails on one crest rather than accumulating.
MSC.1/Circ.1228 covers the operational side of all three. For parametric rolling it advises selecting course and speed so that the encounter period is not close to the roll period, and not close to half the roll period, in following, quartering, head, bow or beam seas. That circular describes two cases: an encounter ratio near 1 to 1, which produces asymmetric rolling that is larger to one side, and an encounter ratio near 1 to 0.5, which produces symmetric rolling with large amplitudes and can occur in head and bow seas.
Class notations and industry practice
Every major society now offers a notation, and they do not implement the same thing.
| Society | Document | Edition | Notation |
|---|---|---|---|
| ABS | Guide for the Assessment of Parametric Roll Resonance in the Design of Container Carriers | August 2024 | PARR-C1, PARR-C2 |
| Bureau Veritas | Rule Note NR 667, Parametric Roll Assessment | December 2024 | PaRoll1, PaRoll2 |
| DNV | DNV rules for classification of ships | Notation from July 2022 | ARCS with PSA or ARD |
| ClassNK | Guidelines on Preventive Measures against Parametric Rolling | February 2023 | PRPM |
| Lloyd’s Register | Rules and Regulations, Part 3, with the ShipRight roll design assessment procedure | July 2025 | RDA |
ClassNK binds its notation directly to the IMO criteria, with a functional requirement on complying with the second generation criteria and an appendix outlining the Level 1, Level 2 and direct assessment criteria. The ABS Guide, by contrast, runs a parallel and older track with its own susceptibility and severity criteria and does not reference the IMO guidelines. Lloyd’s Register’s roll design assessment, introduced in 2025, is deliberately broader and addresses resonant parametric or synchronous rolling, a tacit acknowledgment that the two present the same way on a container stack.
IACS UR C6 on lashing software and UR C7 on the approval and certification of container securing systems apply to container ships contracted on or after 1 July 2025.
Onboard implementation and the bridge
Very little of this reaches the ship. The Level 2 checks and any direct assessment are design-office calculations needing a hull model and hours of computation, not something a loading computer runs before departure. What reaches the bridge is the output: an operational limitation in the approved documentation, or a guidance product presented as tables or a polar diagram of safe speed and heading against sea state.
The stability booklet does not model the mechanism. The joint investigation into the MSC Zoe container loss stated the design position directly: the crew is expected to prevent extreme accelerations from parametric oscillation, dynamic loss of stability, resonant oscillation and impulsive loads, and those mechanisms are therefore not included in the design principles. The design assumes the master avoids the phenomenon, and the master is given no instrument with which to do it.
The natural roll period is the input where practice diverges most. The 2008 IS Code gives \(T_r = 2CB/\sqrt{GM}\) with \(C = 0.373 + 0.023(B/d) - 0.043(L_{WL}/100)\), and MSC.1/Circ.1627 reproduces it. ClassNK uses \(0.8B/\sqrt{GM}\). MARIN’s TopTier guidance uses \(0.86B/\sqrt{GM}\) and then instructs that the rolling period should be measured after departure, because rules of thumb based on metacentric height are not always accurate. On a large container ship at low metacentric height the spread between these formulations is wide enough to move the ship in or out of the resonance band.
Current status
MSC.1/Circ.1627 remains recommendatory. The guidelines record that they were developed envisioning future incorporation into the 2008 IS Code but require testing first, and the Committee agreed to keep them under review in the light of experience gained.
SDC 10, meeting from 22 to 26 January 2024, considered the submission from Denmark and the World Shipping Council on the Maersk Essen calculations and concluded that it was premature to revise the interim guidelines and that more data and practical experience in their application were required. Finland submitted an information paper to SDC 12 in January 2026. As of September 2026 there is no approved IMO output to make the criteria mandatory, and no revision of MSC.1/Circ.1228 has been agreed, so the operational guidance a master actually holds is a circular of 11 January 2007 whose scope paragraph still refers to the superseded Resolution A.749(18).
Limitations
The criteria do not model several things a practitioner should not assume are covered.
Oblique seas are outside the C2 index, which is evaluated in head and following seas only. Real parametric roll casualties have occurred in quartering seas.
The wave environment is North Atlantic. The 16 wave cases and the sea-state weights derive from IACS Recommendation No. 34. For a ship trading a Pacific liner service the scatter data are not representative, and this was one of the mismatches identified in the Maersk Essen submission.
The simulation method is unspecified, so the C2 index is method-dependent. Published independent implementations differ by roughly a factor of two on the same hull. A C2 value quoted without its solver, degrees of freedom, damping model and duration is not a result.
Only principal parametric resonance is addressed. Other resonance regions are explicitly out of scope.
The failure thresholds differ between tiers. Level 2 counts a failure at 25 degrees of roll, while direct assessment uses the lesser of 40 degrees, the angle of vanishing stability or the downflooding angle. A lashing system may be designed to a lower angle than either, in which case the criteria are not protecting the cargo securing arrangement.
Interaction between failure modes is not required to be assessed. MSC.1/Circ.1627 does not require parametric rolling and pure loss of stability to be evaluated together, although both arise from the same physical cause and at least one official casualty investigation has concluded that pure loss of stability on a wave crest may have contributed to the onset of parametric roll resonance.
Green water, cargo shift, wind and directional spread are not modelled in the vulnerability criteria.
The Explanatory Notes carry material this article does not cover. MSC.1/Circ.1652 Appendix 3 holds the roll damping model used in the C2 simulation, and its Part B chapter 2 may address which loading conditions must be assessed.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
What is parametric rolling?
Why is it called parametric?
Is the encounter period half the natural roll period, or twice it?
Does GM rise or fall when a wave crest is amidships?
Which ships are most exposed to parametric rolling?
What are the Second Generation Intact Stability Criteria?
When was MSC.1/Circ.1627 issued?
Are the second generation intact stability criteria mandatory?
Will the criteria become mandatory?
What is the difference between the 2008 IS Code and the second generation criteria?
What does the Level 1 parametric roll criterion calculate?
What wave does Level 1 use?
What is R_PR and how is it determined?
Why does bilge keel area appear in a stability criterion?
Is there a table of R_PR values?
Is there a second condition in Level 1 besides the GM ratio?
Does Level 1 check whether the ship can reach the resonant speed?
What does the Level 2 parametric roll criterion calculate?
What are the Level 2 acceptance standards?
Which wave data does Level 2 use?
How many hydrostatic calculations does C1 require?
Does C1 use the same GM denominator as Level 1?
Does the criteria set cover the second parametric resonance region?
Which roll damping model does Level 2 C2 use?
Why do two software packages give different C2 values for the same ship?
What is a direct stability assessment?
How does a direct assessment handle events that are too rare to simulate?
Can a ship pass Level 2 but fail a direct stability assessment?
Is Level 1 conservative?
What are operational limitations and operational guidance?
Can a ship be certified purely on operational restrictions?
How does parametric roll differ from synchronous roll?
How does parametric roll differ from pure loss of stability?
Do bilge keels and stabilizers prevent parametric roll?
What should a master do when parametric roll starts?
Does a surveyor check parametric roll vulnerability at survey?
Do the class notations implement the IMO criteria?
What does the criteria set not model?
Related Articles
- Second Generation Intact Stability Criteria
- Intact stability
- GZ curve and righting arm
- Metacentric height
- Pure loss of stability in following seas
- Surf-riding and broaching
- Dead ship condition stability criterion
- Excessive acceleration criterion
- Direct stability assessment
- Operational limitations and operational guidance
- Roll damping and bilge keels
- Roll decay test
- Encounter frequency and encounter period
- Response amplitude operator
- Wave scatter diagram and standard wave data
- Bow flare and flare slamming
- Ultra large container ship
- Seakeeping
- Ship motions
- Heavy weather operations
- Marine stabilisers
- Marine stability booklet and loading computer
- Cross curves of stability and KN tables
- Hydrostatics and Bonjean curves
- Naval architecture coefficients
- Hull form design
- Container ship
- Free surface effect
- Weather routing
Sources
- IMO Resolution MSC.267(85): adoption of the International Code on Intact Stability, 2008 (adopted 4 December 2008, in force 1 July 2010)
- IMO MSC.1/Circ.1627: Interim Guidelines on the Second Generation Intact Stability Criteria (10 December 2020), as published by the Liberian Registry
- IMO: Ship Design and Stability, the work programme covering the second generation intact stability criteria
- Marlantes, K.E., Kim, S. and Hurt, L.A. (2022): Implementation of the IMO Second Generation Intact Stability Guidelines, Journal of Marine Science and Engineering 10(1), 41
- American Bureau of Shipping: SDC 10 Brief, 30 January 2024, recording the outcome of the Sub-Committee discussion on the Interim Guidelines
- ClassNK Technical Journal No. 7 (2023): Introduction of Guidelines on Preventive Measures against Parametric Rolling
- ClassNK Technical Journal No. 7 (2023): Simplified Operational Guidance for Preventing Parametric Rolling