Paris MoU: Port State Control in Europe

The Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (Paris MoU) is the administrative arrangement under which the maritime Authorities of European and North Atlantic States inspect foreign merchant ships in their ports against the IMO and ILO conventions, detain those that are substandard, and refuse access to repeat offenders. It was signed in Paris on 26 January 1982, took effect on 1 July 1982, and its current text includes the 46th amendment, in effect since 1 July 2025. The Memorandum names 28 signatory Authorities; with the Russian Federation suspended since 20 May 2022, 27 are active.

In 2025 Paris MoU inspectors carried out 16,474 inspections of 14,554 individual ships and detained 668 of them, a detention rate of 4.18 percent, according to the Paris MoU 2025 Annual Report. Which ships get inspected, and how deeply, is set by a points-based Ship Risk Profile, and the results feed three public performance tables: flags, recognized organizations and ISM companies. For a shipowner, the Paris MoU matters because the record it generates is published on Equasis and on the Paris MoU website, not held only for the next inspector.

What the Paris MoU is and who it binds

The Paris MoU is a regional form of port State control , the right of a State to inspect foreign ships in its ports for compliance with the conventions it is party to. It binds the maritime Authorities that sign it, not States in the treaty sense, and it binds them to a common procedure: the same targeting, the same inspection types, the same detention criteria and one shared database.

Section 1.2 of the Memorandum applies the regime to foreign merchant ships “calling at a port of its State, or anchored off such a port”, so an anchorage call is within scope. A ship flying the flag of a member State is not inspected under the Memorandum by its own flag Authority, which checks it through flag State survey instead.

The legal force comes from two directions. Inside the European Union, the EU Port State Control Directive , Directive 2009/16/EC of 23 April 2009 on port State control (recast) obliges EU Member States to run the inspection regime, and national courts apply the legislation transposing the Directive, not the Memorandum. Outside the EU, Canada, Iceland, Norway, the United Kingdom and Montenegro apply the Memorandum through their own national law. At the international level, UNCLOS Article 219 addresses States which have ascertained:

that a vessel within one of their ports or at one of their off-shore terminals is in violation of applicable international rules and standards relating to seaworthiness of vessels and thereby threatens damage to the marine environment shall, as far as practicable, take administrative measures to prevent the vessel from sailing.

The Article lets such a State permit the vessel to proceed “only to the nearest appropriate repair yard”. Article 218 adds port-State proceedings for discharge violations committed outside the State’s waters when the vessel is voluntarily in port.

Paris MoU origins: the Hague Memorandum and the 1982 signing

The Paris MoU replaced an earlier and narrower arrangement. The “Memorandum of Understanding between Certain Maritime Authorities on the Maintenance of Standards on Merchant Ships”, known as the Hague Memorandum , was signed on 2 March 1978 by maritime Authorities in Western Europe. The Paris MoU’s own history records that it “dealt mainly with enforcement of shipboard living and working conditions as required by ILO Convention no. 147”.

The same history records that “just as the memorandum was about to come into effect in March 1978 a massive oil spill occurred off the coast of Brittany (France) as a result of the grounding of the VLCC ‘Amoco Cadiz’”. The Amoco Cadiz casualty moved the political demand from labour conditions to safety and pollution prevention. The preamble of the 1982 text recalls the Final Declaration of the Regional European Conference on Maritime Safety of 2 December 1980, and section 9.3 states that the Paris MoU supersedes the Hague Memorandum.

Fourteen Authorities signed at the Paris ministerial conference: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The English and French texts are equally authentic (section 9.5).

Accessions and the suspension of the Russian Federation

Membership grew by adherence, with each new Authority taking effect on a stated date. The footnotes to the current text give the sequence:

Canada is the only member outside Europe. Footnote 13 of the Memorandum records that “on 20 May 2022 the membership was suspended until further notice” for the Russian Federation, and the Paris MoU’s 2026 press releases state that “currently 27 maritime Authorities are member”. The suspension removed Russia as an inspecting Authority. It did not remove Russian-flag ships from scrutiny: the Russian flag is ranked 50th on the Grey List of the 2025 performance list, scored on inspections carried out by the other members.

Paris MoU governance: the Committee, the Secretariat and the EU

The Port State Control Committee is the governing body. Section 7.1 gives it one representative of each Authority plus a representative of the European Commission, and it admits international governmental organizations, observers and associates. Its 59th meeting was held in Glasgow from 18 to 22 May 2026.

Section 7.4 places the Secretariat in The Hague, provided by the Netherlands Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management. The European Maritime Safety Agency hosts and runs the inspection database, THETIS, from Lisbon.

Observers at the 59th Committee were the Abuja, Black Sea, Caribbean, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean and Tokyo MoUs, the ILO and the IMO, with the Viña del Mar Agreement attending online, alongside the European Commission and EMSA. The relationship with the EU is structural: 22 of the 27 active Authorities are EU Member States bound by Directive 2009/16/EC, so the Memorandum and the Directive are amended in step. The Directive’s own amendment is covered in the section on changes due in 2027.

Instruments enforced by Paris MoU inspection

A Paris MoU inspection checks a ship against the “relevant instruments” listed in section 2.1 of the Memorandum. The list has 15 entries in the text including the 46th amendment:

Two limits apply. Section 2.2 lets an Authority apply only the instruments that are in force and to which its own State is party, so the list is a ceiling, not a uniform floor. And the ISM Code and the ISPS Code are not separate entries: they are inspected as SOLAS Chapter IX and SOLAS Chapter XI-2 , which is why an ISM failure is recorded as a SOLAS deficiency. Ships below the size thresholds of the conventions are addressed separately in section 2.3 and Annex 1 of the Memorandum. The tonnage measurement certificate is checked on every ship the Tonnage Convention covers.

The Paris MoU Ship Risk Profile under Annex 7

The Ship Risk Profile classifies every ship as a High Risk Ship, a Standard Risk Ship or a Low Risk Ship, and that classification sets how often it is inspected. The system came in with the New Inspection Regime on 1 January 2011, and THETIS recalculates each profile daily, after every inspection, and whenever the flag or recognized organization tables change.

A ship is a High Risk Ship when it scores 5 or more weighting points under Annex 7:

The ship-type row gives a bulk carrier , an oil tanker , a chemical tanker , a gas carrier or a passenger ship a 2-point head start that a container ship or general cargo ship does not carry. NLS tankers, which carry MARPOL Annex II noxious liquid substances, are on the list in their own right. And no single parameter reaches 5 points: a Black List flag contributes at most 2.

A worked case shows how the points combine. A 15-year-old bulk carrier scores 3 on type and age. Add a Black List flag in the medium risk band and it reaches 4, still a Standard Risk Ship. If its ISM company is rated low performance, the 2 company points take it to 6, and it becomes a High Risk Ship. That same hull under a White List flag, with a well-performing company, stays at 3.

Low Risk Ship criteria

A Low Risk Ship has to meet every one of the following conditions, and missing any one of them makes it at best a Standard Risk Ship:

• a White List flag;
• a flag State that has completed the IMO Member State Audit Scheme audit, with the audit confirmation under resolution A.1067(28), or A.974(24) for legacy audits;
• a recognized organization of high performance that is recognized by at least one Paris MoU State;
• a company of high performance;
• at least one inspection in the previous 36 months, with no more than 5 deficiencies recorded at each inspection in that period;
• no detention in the previous 36 months.

A Standard Risk Ship is any ship that is neither high nor low risk. Most of the fleet sits here.

Company performance

Company performance is the parameter an owner controls most directly. It is a generic parameter attached to the ISM company that holds the Document of Compliance, not a historic record of one ship. THETIS computes a deficiency index and a detention index over every ship the company manages in the previous 36 months and compares each with the Paris MoU average.

ISM-related deficiencies weigh 5 points in the deficiency index and all other deficiencies 1. A ban on any ship in the fleet within 36 months makes the company’s detention index “above average” automatically. A company with no inspections in 36 months is rated medium. The effect is fleet-wide: a detention on one managed ship raises the profile of every other ship under the same Document of Compliance, including ships belonging to other owners.

Paris MoU inspection windows and targeting under Annex 8

Annex 8 converts the risk profile into an inspection window, counted from the last inspection in the Paris MoU region:

Priority II applies once the window opens: over 5 months for a High Risk Ship, over 10 for a Standard Risk Ship, and over 24 for a Low Risk Ship. A Priority I ship must be inspected; a Priority II ship may be. Any additional inspection restarts the clock. Annex 8 paragraph 14 counts a mandatory survey of a ro-ro ferry or high-speed passenger craft by an Authority other than the flag as an expanded or more detailed inspection.

Annex 11 gives each Authority a margin. An Authority may miss up to 5 percent of its Priority I High Risk Ship inspections and up to 10 percent of its other Priority I inspections, and an inspection may be postponed by up to 15 days in the circumstances Annex 11 sets out.

Overriding factors

An overriding factor makes a ship Priority I at once, whatever its window. Annex 8 paragraph 11 lists six:

1. ships reported by another member State or the Secretariat, excluding reports that are unexpected factors;
2. ships involved in a collision, grounding or stranding on their way to the port;
3. ships accused of an alleged violation of the discharge provisions;
4. ships that have manoeuvred in an erratic or unsafe manner whereby IMO routeing measures or safe navigational practices were not followed;
5. ships suspended or withdrawn from class for safety reasons since the last PSC inspection;
6. ships that cannot be identified in the database.

Unexpected factors

An unexpected factor makes a ship Priority II and leaves the decision to inspect with the Authority. Annex 8 paragraph 12 lists nine:

1. ships reported by pilots or relevant authorities, which may include vessel traffic service information;
2. ships that did not comply with their reporting obligations;
3. ships with an outstanding ISM deficiency, for 3 months after it was issued;
4. ships previously detained, for 3 months after the detention;
5. ships that are the subject of a report or complaint by the master, a seafarer or any person or organization with a legitimate interest, unless the Authority deems it manifestly unfounded;
6. ships operated in a manner that poses a danger to persons, property or the environment;
7. ships with cargo problems, in particular with noxious or dangerous cargoes;
8. ships for which reliable information shows that the risk parameters differ from those recorded and the risk level is higher;
9. ships holding certificates issued by a formerly Paris MoU-recognized organization whose recognition has been withdrawn since the last inspection.

The crew-complaint route matters under MLC 2006 , because a seafarer’s report is enough to put the ship in the targeting pool.

Paris MoU inspection types under Annex 9

Three levels of inspection exist, and the level is decided by the profile and by what the inspector finds on board.

Initial inspection

An initial inspection is a visit on board to check the certificates and documents listed in Annex 10, such as the Maritime Labour Certificate and DMLC and the statutory safety certificates. Annex 9 paragraph 2 adds a check of the overall condition and hygiene of the ship, covering the navigation bridge, accommodation and galley, decks, cargo holds and engine room, and a check that deficiencies found at earlier inspections have been rectified. Annex 9 paragraph 3 states that “the absence of valid certificates or documents is considered a clear ground” for going further.

More detailed inspection and clear grounds

A more detailed inspection follows where the inspector finds clear grounds to believe that the ship, its equipment or its crew do not substantially meet the requirements. Annex 9 paragraph 6 lists examples of clear grounds:

• absence of principal equipment or arrangements required by the conventions;
• certificates that are clearly invalid;
• documentation required by Annex 10 that is missing, incomplete or falsely maintained;
• serious hull or structural deterioration;
• serious deficiencies in safety, pollution-prevention or navigational equipment;
• a master or crew not familiar with essential shipboard operations;
• key crew members unable to communicate with each other or with others on board;
• false distress alerts not followed by proper cancellation;
• a report or complaint containing information that the ship appears to be substandard;
• an overriding or unexpected factor.

The inspector may test drills and operations. Annex 9 paragraphs 5 and 9 bring the human element within the inspection through the ILO instruments, the ISM Code and STCW, which is why an abandon-ship or fire drill that goes badly can support a detention even where every certificate is valid.

Expanded inspection

An expanded inspection covers the same risk areas in greater depth and adds ship-type items set out in a Paris MoU instruction. Annex 9 makes it mandatory at:

• every periodic inspection of a High Risk Ship;
• every periodic inspection of a Standard or Low Risk Ship that is a risk ship type and more than 12 years old.

At an additional inspection, the inspector may carry out an expanded inspection on professional judgement for the same categories. The 14 risk areas common to the more detailed and expanded inspection are documentation, structural condition, water and weathertight condition, emergency systems, radio communication, cargo operations, fire safety, alarms, living and working conditions, navigation equipment, life-saving appliances, dangerous goods, propulsion and auxiliary machinery, and pollution prevention. They map onto SOLAS Chapter II-1 , SOLAS Chapter II-2 , SOLAS Chapter III , SOLAS Chapter IV and SOLAS Chapter V , plus the MARPOL annexes from MARPOL Annex I onward.

Paris MoU detention, costs and appeal

Under section 3.4 of the Memorandum, a ship is detained when the deficiencies found are clearly hazardous to safety, health or the environment, subject to the repair-yard exceptions in section 3.8, and it stays detained until they are rectified or the Authority accepts conditions for sailing. Each deficiency is recorded against a code and an action; the code structure is covered under PSC deficiency codes .

The Memorandum sets several rules that shape what happens next:

• Repair yard. Section 3.8 lets the Authority allow a detained ship to proceed to a repair yard. Where the ship is sent to a repair yard for non-compliance with the 2011 ESP Code , resolution A.1049(27), the Authority may require the necessary thickness measurements to be carried out in the port of detention before it sails. Where a voyage data recorder whose use is compulsory is not functioning and cannot be readily rectified in the port of detention, the Authority may allow the ship to proceed to the nearest appropriate repair yard or port, or require rectification within 30 days.
• Accidental damage. Section 3.5 provides that no detention order is issued for accidental damage suffered by a ship, provided the SOLAS regulation I/11(c) notifications have been made, the port State was informed before entry or immediately after the damage, remedial action is under way to the Authority’s satisfaction, and any clearly hazardous deficiencies have been addressed.
• Costs. Section 3.11 charges the costs of an inspection that confirms detainable deficiencies to the owner or operator. The detention is not lifted until they are paid or a sufficient guarantee is given.
• Appeal. Section 3.12 gives the owner or operator a right of appeal. An appeal does not suspend the detention or the refusal of access.
• MLC notifications. Section 3.7 requires a detention involving MLC 2006 to be notified also to the shipowners’ and seafarers’ organizations in the port State.

The detention counts toward the flag’s list position, the recognized organization table where the organization is found responsible, the company performance index and the ship’s own detention history. That is four records from one event, and the reason a single detention can move a ship’s profile on more than one parameter.

Where deficiencies were found in 2025

The 2025 Annual Report recorded 51,797 deficiencies, 4,744 of them grounds for detention. Fire safety was the largest category at 16.8 percent of deficiencies, followed by structural and electrical deficiencies under SOLAS Chapter II-1 at 11.6 percent and MLC 2006 Title IV (health protection, medical care, welfare and social security) at 10.0 percent. Fire doors alone were 3.1 percent, seafarers’ employment agreements 1.3 percent and ISM-related deficiencies 4.5 percent.

Paris MoU refusal of access and banning

Refusal of access is the Paris MoU’s strongest sanction: an order that a named ship may not enter any port or anchorage of any member State. Section 4 of the Memorandum, mirrored in Directive 2009/16/EC, triggers it in four situations:

1. a ship flying a Grey List flag detained more than twice in the preceding 24 months;
2. a ship flying a Black List flag detained more than twice in the preceding 36 months;
3. a ship that leaves port without complying with the conditions set by the detaining Authority;
4. a ship that fails to call at the repair yard it was directed to.

A White List flag protects a ship from the multiple-detention trigger, though not from the other two. The duration steps up with each order. A first order can be lifted after 3 months, and a second after 12 months, once the conditions in the Paris MoU instruction on refusal of access are met. A third order can be lifted after 24 months only if the ship’s flag is on neither the Black nor the Grey List, its statutory certificates are issued by a recognized organization recognized by a Paris MoU State, and the company has high performance; otherwise the ban is permanent. Any detention after a third order makes the ban permanent.

Section 4.4 lets a banned ship enter only in cases of force majeure, for overriding safety reasons, or to reduce or minimize the risk of pollution. The Paris MoU’s refusal-of-access page states that a change of ownership, company or flag does not lift the ban.

The numbers are small but rising. Nineteen ships were banned in 2025, against 15 in 2024 and 11 in 2023. Over 2023 to 2025 the 45 bans broke down as 33 for multiple detentions, 11 for failing to call at the indicated repair yard, and 1 for jumping detention. A current list of banned ships is published on the Paris MoU website.

Paris MoU White, Grey and Black List

The White, Grey and Black List ranks every flag with at least 30 inspections over three calendar years by its detention record. It is published annually and measures a flag Administration by the condition of the ships it certifies.

The calculation is a binomial test on each flag’s detentions against its inspections, using a 7 percent yardstick and a significance value z of 1.645. It produces two limits: a flag with fewer detentions than the grey-to-white limit is on the White List, one with more than the black-to-grey limit is on the Black List, and one between the two is on the Grey List. The 7 percent yardstick is then moved in 3 percent steps, each step being one point of excess factor, which ranks flags within and across the lists. The White List is not confined to negative factors: Poland (0.04) and Canada (0.09) are White in the 2025 list, while the Grey List runs from the Republic of Korea at 0.03 to Tunisia at 1.00. The Black List is subdivided by excess factor: 1 to 2 medium risk, 2 to 3 medium to high risk, 3 to 4 high risk, and 4 and above very high risk. The band then feeds Annex 7 as 1 or 2 points.

The 2025 list, valid from 1 July 2026 to 6 July 2027

The list built on 2023 to 2025 data has 40 White, 19 Grey and 10 Black flags. The Cayman Islands (UK) head it, with 299 inspections and no detentions and an excess factor of minus 1.95. The four flags with the most inspections all sit on the White List: Malta 16th (3,637 inspections, 101 detentions), the Marshall Islands 21st (5,166, 167), Liberia 29th (6,319, 276) and Panama 36th (5,731, 338, excess factor minus 0.19). The Grey List ends with Tunisia, ranked 59th.

Panama carries more detentions than any other registry in the table and still sits on the White List, because the test measures detentions against the volume inspected. A small flag with 44 inspections and 9 detentions, Viet Nam’s figures, lands in medium to high risk.

Paris MoU recognized organization performance table

The recognized organization performance table applies the same method to the classification societies and other bodies that issue statutory certificates on a flag’s behalf. An organization needs at least 60 inspections over three years to be listed. The formula uses P of 0.02 and Q of 0.01 in place of the flag values.

The 2025 table lists 31 organizations, against 29 in 2024. The ABS excess factor of minus 1.89 heads it, followed by DNV at minus 1.84, the Korean Register at minus 1.76, Lloyd’s Register at minus 1.74, Bureau Veritas at minus 1.70, RINA at minus 1.54, ClassNK at minus 1.42 and the China Classification Society at minus 1.41. All eight are members of IACS . The average recognized-organization-responsible detention percentage was 0.43 in 2025, against 0.42 in 2024.

The table feeds Annex 7 twice. Low or very low performance adds 1 point, and a Low Risk Ship needs a high-performance organization recognized by a Paris MoU State.

THETIS and public Paris MoU inspection data

THETIS is the port State control information system hosted and operated by EMSA in Lisbon. It went live on 1 January 2011 together with the New Inspection Regime, as the Paris MoU 2011 Annual Report records. Every inspection by every Authority is entered into it, and it computes the risk profile and priority of each ship expected in port, so an inspector sees which ships are due before they arrive.

THETIS is also the platform for EU-only modules such as THETIS-MRV , used for EU MRV reporting, and THETIS-Med. Paris MoU inspection results are published on Equasis , the public ship-safety database, and the Paris MoU publishes its own detention lists, banned-ship list and performance tables. That public record is open to vessel vetting departments and charterers.

Paris MoU Concentrated Inspection Campaigns

A Concentrated Inspection Campaign (CIC) adds a standard questionnaire on one topic to every inspection over three months, normally 1 September to 30 November. Each campaign ends with a published report giving the number of ships inspected and detained on the topic.

The 2024 campaign on crew wages covered 3,863 ships, of which 30 were detained for CIC-related deficiencies, 0.78 percent. The 2026 campaign reads against the ship’s Cargo Securing Manual and runs from 1 September to 30 November 2026. The 2027 topic returns to enclosed space entry , last covered in 2015. The 2018 MARPOL Annex VI campaign remains the only Paris MoU CIC on air emissions.

Alongside the CICs, the 59th Committee approved Focused Inspection Campaigns on a trial basis, covering pilot transfer arrangements, ECDIS , galleys, EPIRBs, fire doors, CLC insurance certificates and the safe stowage of large materials and heavy spare parts.

Paris MoU in figures, 2024 and 2025

The figures are from the Paris MoU 2025 Annual Report and its press release of 30 June 2026. The detention rate is detentions divided by inspections, so it measures the targeted sample, not the fleet.

Paris MoU relationship with IMO, the Tokyo MoU and other regimes

The Paris MoU is one of nine regional port State control arrangements recognized by IMO, and regional port State control began with it in 1982. Its procedures draw on the IMO’s recommendatory Procedures for Port State Control , now resolution A.1206(34), adopted by the IMO Assembly on 3 December 2025, which revoked A.1185(33). IMO sits on the Committee as an observer.

The Tokyo MoU for the Asia-Pacific is the closest partner. The two run their CICs jointly, with the 2023 to 2027 campaigns joint, and the Paris MoU’s 2025 Annual Report records cooperation with the Tokyo MoU and the United States Coast Guard, including a joint submission to IMO on underperforming flag Administrations. Among the other regional port State control MoUs , the Abuja, Black Sea, Caribbean, Indian Ocean and Mediterranean MoUs attended the 59th Committee as observers, with the Viña del Mar Agreement attending online; the Riyadh MoU is named in the cooperation section of the 2025 Annual Report.

Paris MoU and EU Directive changes due on 6 July 2027

The next structural change to the regime is driven by the EU. The Paris MoU press release on its 59th Committee states that the amended EU Port State Control Directive is effective 6 July 2027, and that the Committee agreed amendments to the Memorandum to keep the two aligned in two areas: changes to the flag State and recognized organization performance calculations, and new environmental parameters in the Ship Risk Profile.

As a separate decision, the same Committee agreed to develop a voluntary port State control approach for fishing vessels of 24 metres in length and over.

Until the amending text is published in the Memorandum, the rules described in this article, those of the text including the 46th amendment, remain the rules the inspector applies.

Paris MoU practical implications for owners, managers and masters

The Ship Risk Profile rewards a clean fleet record more than a clean ship. Because company performance is weighted at 2 points and computed across every ship under one Document of Compliance, a manager’s worst ship sets part of the profile of its best. The ISM deficiency weighting of 5 points against 1 for any other deficiency means one ISM finding costs the company index as much as five ordinary ones.

The flag and class choice has a direct inspection cost. A White List flag and a high-performance, Paris MoU-recognized organization are two of the six conditions for the 24 to 36 month window. A flag that falls to the Grey List removes Low Risk Ship status for every ship it registers, and exposes each of them to the 24-month banning trigger.

For the master, the practical points are specific:

• keep the Annex 10 documents together and current, because their absence is itself a clear ground;
• expect an expanded inspection on any risk-type ship over 12 years old, and plan port time for it;
• treat an outstanding ISM deficiency as a 3-month targeting flag;
• report accidental damage to the flag, the recognized organization and the port State before entry, so section 3.5 can apply;
• remember that a crew complaint is an unexpected factor, so MLC 2006 compliance on wages and employment agreements is inspected on demand, not only on schedule.

For sale and purchase and chartering, the Paris MoU record travels with the ship. A buyer in ship sale and purchase should read the detention and banning history on Equasis before inspection, because a third ban can be permanent and a change of flag does not lift it. Exhaust gas cleaning system and ballast water management system defects are inspected against the MARPOL and BWM entries in the relevant-instruments list, so an unreliable system is a detention risk as well as an operating one.

Limitations of the Paris MoU data and rules

The Paris MoU dataset is a targeted sample. Inspectors are sent to high-risk ships first, so the 4.18 percent detention rate for 2025 describes the ships inspected, not the fleet trading in the region. Comparing detention rates between regimes is unsafe for the same reason, since each targets differently.

The performance lists are three-year rolling measures with minimum sample sizes: 30 inspections for a flag and 60 for a recognized organization. A flag or organization below the threshold is not listed, and a small registry’s excess factor moves sharply on a single detention, as the 44-inspection Viet Nam entry shows.

The Memorandum fixes targeting, inspection types and detention criteria, but the depth of an inspection and the judgement on clear grounds rest with the individual inspector.

The rules summarized here are those of the Memorandum including the 46th amendment, effective 1 July 2025, and the performance list valid from 1 July 2026. The Annex 7 weightings, the performance calculations and the scope of the regime are due to change when the amended EU Directive takes effect on 6 July 2027; check the Paris MoU text in force on the date of the call. The detailed detention and deficiency-coding guidance sits in Paris MoU instructions that are not reproduced here.

Related Articles

• Port state control
• Tokyo MoU: Asia-Pacific port State control
• Regional port State control MoUs
• Ship Risk Profile
• Paris MoU White, Grey and Black List
• Refusal of access (banning)
• EU Port State Control Directive
• IMO Procedures for Port State Control
• THETIS inspection database
• Concentrated inspection campaign
• PSC deficiency codes
• MLC 2006 port State control
• Recognized organization
• Fishing vessel port State control